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19761 CASES NOTED 1075
Exclusion of Public From a Proceeding Merely
Upon Request is in Excess of Court's Power
A trial court may, in a dissolution of marriage proceeding,
exclude the public and the press from trial; such exclusion, how-
ever, is within the court's jurisdiction only when cogent reasons
for the exclusion exist.
In the dissolution of marriage' trial of Jackie and Beverly Glea-
son, the court ordered the exclusion of the public and the press from
the entire proceeding at the request of the parties. A reporter who
wished to attend the trial and her publisher filed a suggestion for
the issuance of a writ of prohibition' in the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, challenging the exclusion order.' The court, in
granting the writ, held: Exclusion of the public and the press from
a dissolution of marriage proceeding solely upon the request of the
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.001 et seq. (1975).
2. FLA. App. R. 4.5(d). FLA. STAT. § 81.011 (1975) provides:
The petitioner shall file a petition stating the nature of the action, the proceedings
in the inferior court. . . sought to be prohibited, and demand that writ of prohi-
bition be granted in that behalf.
3. There are two issues as to the propriety of the writ of prohibition. The first is whether
the extraordinary remedy of prohibition, which challenges the acts of a court allegedly acting
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, is proper to challenge an exclusion order of the trial
court. State ex rel. Pope v. Joanas, 278 So. 2d (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). The majority and the
dissent disagreed sharply on this point. Other states have allowed the use of this remedy to
challenge exclusion orders. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557, 490 P.2d
563 (1971); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972); E. W.
Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955). The fact that these cases
involved criminal trials whereas the present case deals with a civil action is irrelevant, as the
sole question here is whether a trial court in improperly excluding the public is acting in
excess of its jurisdiction, where prohibition lies, or merely making a procedural error, for
which prohibition will not lie.
The second issue is whether the publisher in this case had standing to challenge the trial
court's order. The majority ruled that the publisher had standing even though it had no right
beyond that shared with the general public. Other courts have agreed that the press need not
show any right greater than that of the general public to challenge an exclusion order. Kir-
stowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956); E.W. Scripps Co. v.
Fulton, supra; see CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Craemer v. Superior
Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216 (1968). New York requires the showing of a special interest above
that of the general public. United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E. 2d 777 (1954).
This requirement is satisfied by a showing that the order was "directed" at the challenger.
even if it excludes the entire public and press. Oliver v. Postel, supra. Since the Florida rule
is that anyone has standing to suggest a writ of prohibition, Frederick v. Rowe. 105 Fla. 193.
140 So. 915 (1932), and since the ability of the press to gather news is directly impaired by
an exclusion order, there is justification for the majority's holding that no additional right or
special interest is required of the press to challenge the order.
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parties in an act in excess of the court's power. State ex rel. Gore
Newspaper Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
This case of first impression4 presented three interrelated is-
sues: (1) whether the public and the press have a right to attend,
observe, and report civil trials; (2) if such a right exists, whether it
is limited by the power to exclude the public from proceedings upon
good cause; and (3) if such a limitation exists, whether the right of
privacy of the litigants in a dissolution of marriage action would be
a sufficient reason for complete exclusion of the public and the
press.
Concerning the first issue, the relators ' had contended that the
right of the public to attend trials is based on the first amendment
of the United States Constitution' and Article I, section 4 of the
Florida Constitution,7 which guarantee freedom of speech and of the
press. They argued that excluding the press from a trial imposes a
greater restraint on the freedom of the press than restricting the
publication of facts concerning a public trial. The relators cited
cases holding the latter situation unconstitutional absent a clear
and present danger or a serious and imminent threat to a protected
interest." They also said that the free press and speech guarantees
would be meaningless without the correlative rights of access to
governmental proceedings, including trials.' The respondent, on the
other hand, argued that no public right to attend trials exists.'"
The court rejected the relator's theory of a constitutional right
of public access, on the ground that freedom of the press does not
4. In the Commonwealth, exclusion of the public in divorce proceedings is reversible
error. McPherson v. McPherson, 11935] App. Cas. 117; Scott v. Scott, L.R. 119131 App.
Cas. 417. In Florida, there is no reversal if the appellant fails to show prejudice. Coggan v.
Coggan, 214 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). The only other relevant American case is Bloomer
v. Bloomer, 197 Wis. 140, 221 N.W. 734 (1928), where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused
to reverse an exclusion order on appeal when the appellant had requested it at trial.
5. The party who files the suggestion for a writ of prohibition.
6. "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This limitation applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
7. "Every person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects but shall'
be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press." FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
8. United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dickinson,
465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972); State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d
608 (1971); State ex rel. Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Rose, 271 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
9. Brief for Relator at 4.
10. Brief for Respondent at 4.
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confer upon the press a constitutionally protected right of access to
sources of information not available to others." The court also re-
jected the respondent's argument, however, and instead recognized
a public right of access to the courts based upon the common law
and public policy. 2
At common law, all trials, whether civil or criminal, were open
and public,' 3 with certain limited exceptions. 4 The public trial rule
existed for reasons quite apart from those interests protected by the
criminal defendant's constitutional right to a public trial,' and in-
clude the possibility that
11. Tribune Review Publ. Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958). Cases which
uphold challenges by the press to the exclusion of the public, Kirstowsky v. Superior Court,
143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956), and E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App.
157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955), and which reject such challenges, United Press Ass'ns v. Valente,
308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954), have all recognized that freedom of the press is not
directly involved. Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held a court order prohibiting extrajudicial comment by anyone involved in a trial invalid as
an abridgment of freedom of the press. CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
12. 313 So. 2d at 788. The existence of this right has been a matter of dispute in criminal
cases. In United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954), the New York
Court of Appeals held that the right to a public trial belongs to a criminal defendant alone.
The court saw the right to a public trial as a device to secure the criminal defendant's right
to a fair trial, and a right which he could waive. This view is supported by Geise v. United
States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958) and United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.
1949). The dissent in Valente argued that the majority confused the criminal defendant's
right to a public trial, guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution,
with the common law right of the public to attend trials. While the former is a device to secure
a fair trial for the criminal defendant, the latter is motivated by different considerations, such
as improving the quality of the testimony and instilling public respect and confidence in the
judicial system. This analysis was accepted in E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App.
157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955). Likewise, it has been held that while a criminal defendant may
waive his right to a public trial, he has no right to insist upon a private trial. Avery v. State,
15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972); see Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1965).
Both Scripps and United Press involved situations where state law required that courts
be "open." Both cases held that the provisions were merely declaratory of existing law, and
Scripps explicitly states that the decision would be the same without that provision. Cases
striking down exclusion orders based upon the same or similar provisions include: Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557, 490 P.2d 563 (1971); Kirstowsky v. Superior
Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956); Des Moines Register and Tribune Co. v.
Hildreth, 181 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1970) (civil case). Florida has no such provision.
13. M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (1971 ed.) 254-56; E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF
ENGLISH LAW 73 (6th ed. 1966); see 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 373.
14. Where there was danger of overcrowding, risk of violence and brawls, or moral harm
of satisfying pruriency in trials of certain crimes, exclusion was allowed. 6 WiGMOR. ON
EVIDENCE, § 1835(1) (3d ed. 1940). It was also allowed where children or trade or official secrets
were involved. JENKS, supra note 13 at 74.
15. See note 12 supra.
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any person, unconcerned as well as concerned, may as "amicus
curiae" inform the court better, if he thinks they are in error, that
justice may be done;.. . . that truth may be discovered, in civil
as well as criminal cases.'"
Moreover, open access to the courts guarantees the public's respect
for, acquaintance with, and confidence in judicial remedies.' Rec-
ognizing that courts are public institutions, the United States Su-
preme Court has said:
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is
public property. . . . There is no special perquisite of the judici-
ary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of
democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which
transpire in proceedings before it.'"
In addition to this legitimate interest that the public at large
has in all judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court of Florida has
recognized that citizens have a special interest in divorce actions.
Since marriage is of vital interest to society and the state, it has
frequently been said that in every divorce suit the state is a third
party whose interests take precedence over the private interests
of the spouses."
This public interest is even stronger in Florida today, as the
dissolution of marriage law is a new and controversial application
of the no-fault principle to divorces. The voters of the state have an
interest in the success of this new procedure.
Along with deciding that the public (and hence the press)2' does
in fact possess a right of access to the courts in civil proceedings,
16. 11 How. St. Tr. 460, quoted in 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 1834 (3d ed. 1940).
17. 313 So. 2d at 786.
18. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). Significantly, the Texas court below had
attempted to distinguish the civil from the criminal case by saying: "The case pending before
the court was of consequence only to the litigants. The public, as such, had no interest in
the outcome .... " Ex parte Craig, 150 Tex. Crim. 598, 616, 193 S.W.2d 178, 188 (1946),
reu,'d. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
19. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970); see Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 44'
Wash. 2d 689, 270 P.2d 464 (1954). Owing to the State's interest in both perpetuating the
marital relationship and regulating the dissolution procedure, Florida courts have required
that evidence be taken, Pickson v. Dougherty, 109 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959), even under
the new dissolution law, Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973). A divorce will not be
granted merely upon the request of the parties. Underwood v. Underwood, 12 Fla. 434 (1868),
quoted with approval in Ryan.
20. See note 3 supra for discussion of the press' standing to assert this public right.
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the court also dealt with the question of whether a trial court has
the power to exclude the public, and if so, when.
There have always been exceptions to the common law rule of
open trials, either provided for by statute or recognized under the
inherent power of the court to control its own proceedings.2 Since
Florida has no statutory provision for the exclusion of the public
from dissolution proceedings22 any power of exclusion must be based
upon the inherent power of the trial court. While recognizing that
this inherent power does exist, the court determined that it exists
only where there are cogent reasons for exclusion, 3 because it di-
rectly contravenes the public's right of access.
The court's holding on this issue can be supported by analogy
to criminal law. There, the inherent power to limit access or even
exclude the public to prevent interference with the orderly course
of the proceeding exists even though the defendant has a constitu-
tional right to a public trial. By reason of this conflict, the inherent
power to exclude is limited to cases where there are cogent reasons
for exclusion, and only as to that part of the proceeding for which
those reasons exist. 5 By analogy, these limitations may be extended
to civil cases, where the exercise of this power would directly con-
travene the public's right of access.
Thus, the ultimate issue in this case was whether a cogent
reason for exclusion existed. The trial court had acted on the bare
request of the parties who failed to advance any reasons, cogent or
otherwise, to justify the exclusion. It was on this ground that the
court invalidated the exclusion order.2" The court did, however, dis-
cuss the right of privacy of the litigants, and indicated that there
21. See note 14 supra.
22. Exclusion is statutorily allowed in divorce proceedings in Arizona, Connecticut, New
York, North Dakota, and Oregon. Florida statutorily allows exclusion at bastardy proceed-
ings, FI.A. STAT. § 742.031 (1975), certain juvenile proceedings, FLA. STAT. § 63.162 (1975),
and where any person under 16 is testifying concerning any sex offense, FLA. STAT. § 801.231
(1975). The first two involve only certain specified actions. The third situation involves a
broader spectrum of cases, but specifically excludes the press from any exclusion order pur-
suant to it.
23. 313 So. 2d at 784.
24. Brumfield v. State, 108 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1958); Robinson v. State, 64 Fla. 437, 60 So.
118 (1912); accord, United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States cx
rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965).
25. Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956): see United
States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d
Cir. 1949).
26. 313 So. 2d at 783.
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may exist circumstances under which this right may be a cogent
reason for exclusion. 7 Since the briefs of the respondent9 and ami-
cus curiae29 specifically advance the right of privacy of the litigants
as the reason for exclusion, any possible violation of this right
should be investigated here. Inasmuch as the sole reason advanced
for exclusion was the litigant's personal wishes, the only apparent
aspect of the right of privacy concerned in this case was the desire
of the litigants to avoid general publicity about the dissolution. 9
Such a right of privacy may stem from either of two distinct
sources. The first is the constitutional right to privacy3 used in Roe
v. Wade 2 to strike down various abortion statutes.'" The Supreme
Court recognized that only those personal rights which can be
deemed fundamental are included in this right.34
Initially, this may imply that the privacy right asserted by the
Gleasons was constitutionally guaranteed, as the right to marital
privacy was found fundamental in Griswold v. Connecticut." The
privacy right of the Gleasons involved marital affairs and thus,
according to this logic, must be protected as part of the fundamental
right to marital privacy.
Such a simplistic approach, however, ignores the possibility
that the right to marital privacy may not be fundamental under all
27. 313 So. 2d at 785.
28. Brief for Respondent at 10.
29. Brief for Beverly Gleason as Amicus Curiae at 12; Brief for Jackie Gleason as Amicus
Curiae at 14. The latter specifically raised the constitutional right of privacy of the litigants
as a reason for excluding the public.
30. This view is supported by the scope of the exclusion order, which excluded the public
from the entire procedure. If the litigants were concerned about the possible disclosure of
intimate matters, a more narrowly drawn order excluding the public from only those parts of
the procedure concerning those matters would have sufficed. The only aspect of the right of
privacy that could justify exclusion from the entire trial is the desire of the litigants to avoid
publicity generally about the trial.
31. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating miscegenation statutes);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down certain anti-contraception laws),
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. The Court basically adopted a substantive due process concept, and included the
right to privacy in the "liberty" guaranteed by the due process clause. The Court held that'
the fundamental right to privacy could not be abridged absent a compelling state interest.
Other decisions have based the constitutional right to privacy on the ninth amendment. Roe
v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), and on the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. "These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed 'funda-
mental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' .. are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152.
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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circumstances. If this were so, any privacy right, no matter how
small, which involves marital affairs would be raised to constitu-
tional dimension. The fact that the Supreme Court has limited the
constitutional right to privacy to "only [those] personal rights that
can be deemed fundamental"3 shows a hesitancy to expand this
relatively new constitutional right. Furthermore, even assuming
that the privacy right of the Gleasons was fundamental, it could still
be abridged with a showing of a "compelling state interest. ' ':3 7 The
existence of such an interest depends upon the nature of the privacy
right asserted and the rights of others that it involves.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the facts of the instant
case. The Gleasons asked for the exclusion order without giving any
reasons." The court granted the requested order as a matter of
course, 39 and excluded the press and public from the entire proceed-
ing.' These facts indicate that this case involved only the desire of
public figures to avoid publicity.4' Thus, this case should not be
confused with one in which a narrowly drawn exclusion order pro-
tects against publicity concerning testimony about intimate affairs,
where the privacy rights of the litigants would be far greater.
The mere avoidance of publicity has never been held to be of
constitutional stature; indeed, most states do not even allow a rem-
edy in tort for invasion of privacy,4" where the cause of action is
undue publicity. Therefore, even if it is found that public figures'
right to avoid publicity is "fundamental," a "compelling state inter-
est" may be found in the public's right to open trials, especially in
dissolution cases.43 Using either approach the result is the same; this
exclusion order was not barred by the Constitution.
Another right of privacy may arise from the law of torts.
Florida is among a minority of states that recognize such a right,
which is "defined as the right of an individual to be let alone and
live a life free from unwarranted publicity."44 This right, however,
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
37. Id. at 155.
38. 313 So. 2d at 783.
39. Id. at 779.
40. Reply brief for Relator at 1.
41. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
42. Florida, however, does. See notes 44 and 45 infra and accompanying text.
43. See notes 12 to 18 supra and accompanying text.
44. Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961); see Jacova
v. Southern Radio and Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla.
198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); Annot., 168 A.L.R. 430 (1947).
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must be accommodated to the freedoms of speech and of the press,
and the right of the public to the dissemination of information. 5
Moreover, it is limited with regard to persons and events in which
the public has legitimate interest,4" although such public figures do
not waive their entire right of privacy.47 While a revelation of inti-
mate marital matters would probably be considered outside the
limits of any such waiver, the violation of the desires of the parties
to avoid general publicity about a dissolution proceeding would not.
Thus, under either theory and the facts of this case, a public
trial did not threaten the litigants' right of privacy. Recognizing
that there may be cases where exclusion will be necessary to protect
the rights of the litigants, the court provided that the trial court
may
under its inherent power. . . for cogent reasons exclude the pub-
lic and the press from any judicial proceeding to protect the rights
of the litigants and otherwise further the administration of jus-
tice.4"
In so holding, the court directed the trial court to look to
the type of civil proceeding, the nature of the subject matter and
the status of the participants [as] factors to be considered when
evaluating the cogent reasons for excluding the public and the
press from access to the court . . ..
The main significance of the court's holding lies in its recogni-
tion of an enforceable public right of access to civil proceedings.
This right implies that any restriction on access to a trial must be
justified by cogent reasons. This gives the press a weapon, quite
45. Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715, 71M (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
46. Id. An actor is a public figure and waives at least part of his right to privacy. Chaplin
v. NBC, 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio 338 (1938).
This is also true of the spouse of an actor. Carlisle v. Fawcett Productions, 201 Cal. App. 2d
733 (1962).
47. Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964); Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa.
Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959). In libel actions, publications about divorces of non-public
figures are not within the ambit of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which
held that a publication which concerns a subject of legitimate public interest is privileged
and malice must be proved in a successful libel action. See Firestone v. Time, Inc., 96 S.Ct.
958 (1976). The Firestone definition of "public figure" does not control here as the truthful
reporting of events, the subject of invasion of privacy litigation, does not require the same
limitations as false reporting, the subject of libel suits. The Firestone opinion dealt only with
libel actions.




separate and apart from freedom of the press, with which to attack
such restrictions. A recent case in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit " used this dual approach by invalidating
a direct ban on publication as a violation of freedom of the press and
invalidating a ban on courtroom sketching since there was no valid
reason for it.
Significantly, the court in the instant case was explicit that the
right of access is not absolute. Under certain circumstances, the
litigant's right of privacy may be a cogent reason for the exclusion
of the public. By leaving this possibility open, the court struck an
appropriate balance between the right of the public to open govern-
ment, including the judiciary, and the right of litigants not to have
the most intimate details of their lives thrust into the public eye.
By recognizing both of these considerations, and accommodating
each to the other, the court has sought to solve the difficult problem
presented by two fundamental rights in conflict.
TAMMANY DON TENBROOK
Military Restriction Triggers the Right to a
Speedy Civilian Trial
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was
faced with a review of a denial of a speedy trial violation claim
based upon a delay of over 4 years from commencement of mili-
tary proceedings to a civilian indictment. In overruling the trial
court, the fourth circuit gave an in depth analysis of the "factors"
deemed controlling by the United States Supreme Court in re-
viewing such a claim. The author concludes that, notwithstand-
ing a finding of a violation in the principal case, the right to a
speedy trial may be at the mercy of prosecutorial discretion.
On May 1, 1970, appellant, a Captain in the United States
Army, was charged by the Army with the murders of his wife and
50. United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974).
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